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Symposium:  Collective Management of Copyright:  Solution or 
Sacrifice? 
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Copyright:  What Could Be the Role of 
Collective Management? 
Séverine Dusollier  and Caroline Colin** 
Whether originating from copyright scholarship or from legislative discussion, 
proposals to authorize the transfer of copyrighted works through peer-to-peer 
(“P2P”) networks have been abundant in the last ten years as an alternative to 
seemingly difficult to enforce and unsuccessful repression-based solutions.  As Neil 
Netanel described it: 
P2P controversy is a story of the copyright industries’ increasingly brazen—
some say desperate—attempts to shut down P2P file-swapping networks, 
disable P2P technology and shift the costs of control onto third parties, 
including telecommunications companies, consumer electronics 
manufacturers, corporate employers, universities, new media entrepreneurs 
and the taxpayers.1 
Although the extent and the forms of these schemes to authorize the transfer of 
copyrighted works through P2P networks vary greatly, they all share one similarity: 
the sums collected in counterpart to the authorization will be managed and 
distributed to the authors by collective management societies.  Entrusting collective 
societies with this new role is logical because they have the institutional 
competence to issue blanket licensing and collect lump sums generated from the 
mass use of works, a task for which individual exercise of copyright is ill-suited.2  
 
   Professor, University of Namur (Belgium) and Head of the Center for Research in 
Information, Law and Society (“CRIDS”). 
 **  Doctor in Law and Senior Researcher, Center for Research in Information, Law and Society 
(“CRIDS”).  This Paper has benefited from a study on peer-to-peer (“P2P”) licensing commissioned by 
a Belgian collective management organization.  The study was carried out by the Center of Research in 
Computer Law (“CRID”), and particularly by Dr. Caroline Colin. 
 1. Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7–8 (2003). 
 2. See Daniel Gervais, The Changing Role of Copyright Collectives, in COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (Daniel Gervais ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2006)].  For a revised version, see 
Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright:  Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, in 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2010)]. 
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Compulsory licensing schemes necessarily involve collective management 
organizations that are in charge of collecting and distributing the levies imposed by 
law. 
However, such proposals neglect to address the legal and practical difficulties 
that collective management societies would face should they become in charge of 
collecting and distributing financial compensation for the use of P2P networks to 
upload and download creative works.  This Paper endeavors to contribute to the 
debate surrounding the use of collective management societies to manage 
compulsory licensing schemes by exploring the possibility of establishing efficient 
collective management of consumer-to-consumer distribution of works of 
authorship. 
First, this Paper will review the legal status of P2P file sharing (Part I).  Part II 
will then analyze some of the major proposals around the world to “license,” in one 
way or another, the P2P transfer of works; it will explore the variations among such 
proposals and the extent to which they deviate from the principle of the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders.  Next, Part III will review the legal compliance of the 
various proposed systems from the perspective of the existing international 
copyright framework.  Finally, Part IV will address some practical difficulties that 
the collective management societies might face when establishing proposed 
schemes. 
I.  ENFORCEMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS 
Peer-to-peer sharing of works has been declared an infringement of copyright in 
many countries.3  There is no longer any doubt that uploading works on P2P 
networks is against copyright principles, as, in most cases, it makes available 
protected works without authorization from copyright owners.4  The legal status of 
the mere downloading of works from P2P networks is less clear.  Mere 
downloading is certainly an act of reproduction unauthorized by the authors or 
neighboring rights holders.  Yet, its permissibility as a fair use or private copy has 
been challenged in some countries.5  Downloading also raises the question whether 
 
 3. See PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING AND SECONDARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Alain 
Strowell ed., 2009). 
 4. In the United States, the leading case is the Supreme Court decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  Grokster primarily addresses the liability of the 
provider of the P2P tool but implies that sharing files infringes copyright.  See id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  French courts have decided many cases on the issue, beginning in 2004.  See, e.g., Cour 
d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 13ème ch., Apr. 27, 2007, (Fr.), available at 
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=1954; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] 
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Havre, Sept. 20, 2005, 260/2005 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=748; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of 
original jurisdiction] Vannes, Apr. 29, 2004, 656/2004 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/ 
visu.php?ID=503. 
 5. For French decisions, see Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Montpellier, 3ème ch. 
crim., Mar. 10, 2005, 04/01534 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=650, aff’d, 
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] ch. crim., May 30, 2006, No. 3228 (Fr.), 
available at http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=830; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary 
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permissibility of a private copy should depend on whether it was made from a legal 
source.6  If the permissibility of a private copy turns on whether it was made from a 
legal source, then a copyrighted work downloaded from a P2P networks would no 
longer have private copy status because its source was unauthorized by the 
copyright owner.  Germany has modified its copyright law to permit private copies 
only when they are made from a source that is not patently illegal. 
To limit the development of P2P networks, copyright owners have primarily 
sued those who make such sharing possible—the developers of P2P software and 
the hosting providers of BitTorrent indexing (i.e. metadata about files available for 
downloading using the BitTorrent technology).  After some hesitation, courts have 
generally held  developers of P2P software liable for aiding and abetting copyright 
infringement.7  Irrespective of the possible lawful uses of the P2P technology, 
courts have held that transferring copyrighted works without authorization is the 
primary use of P2P technology, as such use is sometimes even promoted by sellers 
of the software.8 
At times, copyright owners have also tried to impose liability on Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) by exploiting the limited space for ISP liability left by safe 
harbor regimes.  In Belgium, an Internet service provider (“ISP”) has been enjoined 
 
court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 31ème ch., Dec. 8, 2005, No. 12 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=785, aff’d Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 
13ème ch., Apr. 27, 2007, (Fr.); Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction], Bayonne, Nov. 15, 2005, 1613/2005 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/ 
visu.php?ID=768; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Havre, 
Sept. 20, 2005, 260/2005 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/ jpt/visu.php?ID=748; Tribunal de 
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Meaux, 3ème ch., Apr. 21, 2005, 
SM/1726 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=705.  A similar Canadian decision 
is BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] F.C. 488 (Can.), aff'd [2005] F.C. 193 (Can.) (refusing to allow 
record labels to obtain subscriber information of ISP customers alleged to have been infringing 
copyright and holding that downloading a song was not illegal). 
 6. See generally Christophe Caron & Yves Gaubiac, L’échange d’Oeuvres sur l’Internet ou le 
P2P, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE VICTOR NABHAN, CAHIERS DE PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE 23–
59 (2004); Séverine Dusollier, L’utilisation Légitime de L’oeuvre:  un Nouveau Sesame pour le Bénéfice 
des Exceptions en Droit D’auteur, COMMUNICATION COMMERCE ÉLECTRONIQUE, Nov. 2005, at 18–20. 
 7. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (providing the first case against a P2P 
software developer, distinguishable from later cases, as the developer’s site operated by hosting the 
copyrighted files in a central server); Arista Records L.L.C. v. Lime Grp. L.L.C., 532 F. Supp. 2d 556 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd. v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. [2005] 220 ALR 1 
(Austl.); Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Jan. 29, 2003, H17.3.31, No. 16 Ne 446 (Japan), 
summary available at http://www.jasrac.or.jp/ejhp/release/2003/0129.htm; HR 19 december 2003, AMI 
2004, 1, 9 (Burma/Kazaa) (Neth.) (holding that the P2P service Kazaa was not liable); Rb.-Amsterdam, 
21 juni 2007, 369220 / KG ZA 07-840 AB/MV (Stichting BREIN/Leaseweb BV) (Neth.), available at 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BA7810, aff’d, 
Hof’s-Amsterdam, 3 juli 2008, 106.007.074/01KG (Neth.), available at http://jure.nl/bd6223; see also 
Allen N. Dixon, Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet:  
Overview of International Developments, in PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING AND SECONDARY LIABILITY 
IN COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 3, at 24 (citing case law of other countries). 
 8. See Grotsker, 545 U.S. 913; see also Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson, Inducers and 
Authorisers:  A Comparison of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Grokster Decision and the Australian Federal 
Court’s KaZaa Ruling, 11 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 1 (2006). 
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by a court to set up a filtering system to prevent its subscribers from using Internet 
access to benefit from P2P sharing.9  Reference for preliminary ruling has been 
addressed to the Court of Justice of the European Union about the compatibility of 
this injunction and filtering system with the liability safe harbor regime of the 
European Union directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce—a directive that 
exempts Internet intermediaries from any liability and from any obligation to 
monitor Internet uses—and is pending before the European Union Court of 
Justice.10 
Direct infringers of copyright—the users of P2P networks who provide and get 
access to copyrighted works with no authorization from the rights holders—have 
largely been safe from litigation.  This can be explained both by commercial 
strategies—it makes little sense for a fragile industry to choose to sue and 
antagonize its own consumers—and by legal constraints—for example, in the 
European Union, where personal data protection laws sometimes bar identification 
of the infringers, direct infringers can hide behind IP addresses.11  The music 
industry, however, has announced that thousands of users have been sued for file 
sharing all over the world.12 
These judicial adventures with regard to P2P users and contributors are not 
without parallel legislative responses.  An increasing number of countries have 
opted for specific remedies and procedures designed to limit P2P file sharing.13  
France has been a pioneer in this category with its three-strike rule, known as the 
HADOPI approach, which aims to deter users from engaging in musical or 
audiovisual file sharing.14  It has yielded considerable public opposition.  The 
approach’s key principle lies in the so-called “graduated response” it offers to 
copyright owners to stop an Internet user from engaging in P2P file sharing.15 
 
 9. Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Bruxelles, June 29, 2007, 
No. 04/8975/A (Belg.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=939. 
 10. Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (Sabam) v. 
Netlog NV, 2010 OJ (C 288) 18. 
 11. Case C-275/06, Promusicae c. Telefonica de Espana, 19 Feb. 2009; Case C-557-07, LSG-
Gesellschaft, (holding that the European Court of Justice does not strictly forbid the identification of 
data related to IP addresses on privacy grounds but requires that personal data laws explicitly provide an 
exception to the principles of privacy for copyright enforcement motives and define an adequate balance 
between those two fundamental protections). 
 12. See Press Release:  Polish Music Industry Continues Legal Actions Against Illegal File-
Sharing, IFPI (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_news/20070420.html. 
 13. Graduated responses have been enacted in South Korea, the United Kingdom, Ireland 
(through legal settlement between copyright holders and the biggest ISP), Thailand and Chile.  New 
Zealand and Malaysia are expected to implement new laws in 2011. 
 14. Loi 2009-699 du juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur Internet 
[Law 2009-699 of June 12, 2009 Promoting the Dissemination and Protection of Creation on the 
Internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
June 13, 2009, p. 9666. 
 15. Actually, the offence provided by the French law is not copyright infringement, for there is no 
evidence that the holder of the IP address of the computer used to engage in P2P is the person that has 
effectively transferred files.  The law prohibits the practice of securing one’s own Internet access to 
prevent its use for copyright infringement purposes, which is a nothing but a trick to avoid debate about 
the guilt of the access subscriber.  See Décret 2010-695 du 25 juin 2010 instituant une contravention de 
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Under this approach, an email is first sent to the user whose IP address has been 
identified as making unauthorized transfers of protected content.  In the second 
stage, the warning is sent in the form a registered letter.  Finally, should the user 
persist in her sharing behavior, the Internet connection can be suspended and 
severed.16 
The management of the system is entrusted with an administrative authority 
called the HADOPI (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection 
des Droits sur Internet).  Under the law as it was initially adopted, the HADOPI 
had the power to cut the Internet connection after three warnings to the recidivist 
user.  This legislation was invalidated by the French Constitutional Council, which 
held that the right to Internet access is a fundamental right whose suspension can 
only be pronounced by a judge.17  Now suspension of Internet access takes place 
during a judicial proceeding, albeit in a rapid and simplified procedure. 
Along the same line, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), 
negotiated by many Western countries, can be interpreted as encouraging ISPs to 
police the activities of their subscribers.18  On that basis, countries could feel 
enabled to enact HADOPI-like solutions and remedies.19 
A second approach would be to develop methods of legalizing P2P file sharing 
which could simultaneously generate financial compensation to copyright holders. 
This approach aims to transform the formidable machine for distributing works of 
verified authorship into a mechanism that ensures remuneration for the creators 
through the establishment of a collective licensing scheme.  Proposals in that 
purpose will now be analyzed. 
II.  PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION SCHEMES FOR PEER-TO-PEER 
NETWORKS 
A.  THE MODELS PROPOSED TO AUTHORIZE PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING 
Proposals to legitimize P2P file sharing by providing compensation to authors 
have been advocated by copyright scholars all over the world.  In the United States, 
William Fisher’s proposal is very well known.20  Fisher proposes an administrative 
compensation system in which the copyright owner of a piece of music or film can 
 
négligence caractérisée protégeant la propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet [Decree 2010-695 of 
June 25, 2010 Protecting Copyright on the Internet by Establishing a Misdemeanor of Heightened 
Negligence], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], June 25, 2010, p. 9666. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Conseil constiutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC, June 10, 2009, 
J.O. 9675 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 
 18. See Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty art. 27(4), Dec. 3, 2010, available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
webfm_send/2417. 
 19. The graduated response is not explicitly provided for in ACTA, which only requires larger 
involvement of ISPs in copyright enforcement.  It will nonetheless allow countries to implement it. 
 20. See generally WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:  TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004). 
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register the work with the Copyright Office to obtain a unique registration number 
that could be used to track the distribution and the use of the file.21  Under this 
approach, the government would collect a tax on devices and services used to gain 
access to digital entertainment content and would then distribute it to copyright 
owners in proportion to the rates of consumption of their works, based on the 
tracking enabled by the digital file identification.22  Noncommercial file sharing 
would be legalized and would apply to all copyrighted works.  Only registered 
works would benefit from the compensation yielded by the tax system.23 
Neil Netanel similarly proposed to authorize noncommercial sharing of works of 
authorship by providing compensation for the authors that would be collected in the 
form of a levy.24  Distribution of works in P2P networks would be allowed under a 
compulsory licensing scheme.  Copyright owners would then receive compensation 
through a levy paid by providers of products or services whose value has been 
raised by file sharing, such as Internet access, P2P software and consumer 
electronic devices used to store, copy and listen to files downloaded from P2P 
networks.  The determination of the rate of the levy would be negotiated with the 
copyright owners, but ultimately decided by a Copyright Office Tribunal should 
negotiation fail.  Netanel’s proposal bears much resemblance to the system of 
compulsory licensing used in Europe for private copy. 
Jessica Litman introduced a supplementary feature in the systems elaborated 
above:  an opt out possibility for the rights holders.25  Her proposal is in line with 
those of Netanel and Fisher, as it would set up a system where file swapping using 
the P2P technology would be legalized in connection with compensation to the 
copyright owners.  However, owners would be entitled to regain control of 
distribution of their works by choosing between letting their creative works be 
shared in exchange for some financial compensation or exploiting them under a 
DRM-protected format.26  The default legal rule would be the compensation-
without-control model.27  Copyright owners would have to take a positive step to 
opt out of such a default system by making their works available in what Litman 
calls a “*.drm format,” capable of conveying copyright management information.28  
She opposes the two alternatives as “sharing,” on one hand, and “hoarding” on the 
other.29  Copyright owners’ abilities to regain some control over their works and 
prevent them from being distributed in file sharing networks would be technically 
formalized.30  Other American and Canadian scholars have pleaded for similar 
 
 21. See generally id. 
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. Id. at 248. 
 24. See generally Netanel, supra note 1. 
 25. See generally Jessica D. Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 
(2004). 
 26. Id. at 41. 
 27. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 254 (2001). 
 28. Litman, supra note 25, at 47. 
 29. Id. at 41. 
 30. Litman explains how the copyright holders could withdraw copies of their works already 
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methods of legalizing P2P file swapping and compensating copyright holders.31 
In Europe, Alexander Peukert, a German legal scholar, has responded to 
Litman’s proposal with a reverse system.32  Instead of a default rule that legalizes 
P2P file transfers which gives rights holders the freedom to opt out, he proposes 
that the default rule should give copyright owners the exclusive right to enforce 
control over P2P and the option to choose the benefit of a levy-based system put in 
place by the government.  His system would thus use an opt in mechanism. 33  His 
proposal differs from voluntary management of copyright, as copyright owners 
would not have to organize themselves into a collective management society or rely 
on the readiness of users to pay the required fee, because the levy would be 
imposed upfront on certain products and services.34  Some authors, perhaps most, 
would be encouraged to opt for the compulsory licensing system, as it would 
guarantee some remuneration for the transfer of their works that they were 
otherwise powerless to control or prevent. 
French scholar Phillipe Aigrain has published a book that has garnered much 
commentary, titled Internet & Creation.35  Aigrain proposes a detailed system, 
where users would pay a monthly fee to benefit from a blanket licensing for the 
transfer of works through P2P networks.  The collected sums would be used to 
compensate copyright holders and to feed a fund dedicated to financing creation. 
Alongside theoretical development in the field, proposals for authorizing P2P 
file sharing have surfaced in legislative arenas and with lobbyists.  Political 
representatives have sometimes advocated systems that would grant compensation 
to copyright owners and allow users to engage in noncommercial online 
distribution of works of authorship.  During the legislative discussion regarding the 
incorporation into French law of the European Union directive of 2001 on 
copyright in the information society, an amendment setting up a levy-based 
compulsory licensing scheme had been enacted by the opposition before being 
withdrawn by the majority supporting the government, making a great fuss in the 
 
released in unprotected formats from the levy system by recalling them.  Id. at 48. 
 31. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 27, at 254; Gervais, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2010), supra note 2, at 17–18 (providing a more recent proposal); 
Daniel J. Gervais, Use of Copyright Content on the Internet:  Considerations on Excludability and 
Collective Licensing, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 517–49 
(Michael Geist ed., 2005) [hereinafter Gervais, Considerations on Excludability]; Raymond Shih Ray 
Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:  Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 305 (2002); Glynn S. Lunney, The Death of Copyright:  Digital Technology, 
Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 852–69, 886–920 
(2001). 
 32. See generally Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network 
Environment, in PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING AND SECONDARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW, supra 
note 3, at 148–95. 
 33. Id. at 191. 
 34. Id. 
 35. PHILLIPE AIGRAIN, INTERNET & CRÉATION:  COMMENT RECONNAITRE LES ÉCHANGES HORS-
MARCHÉ SUR INTERNET EN FINANÇANT ET RÉMUNÉRANT LA CREATION (2008).  This title reverses the 
name of the law enacting the HADOPI remedy to P2P:  Creation and Internet. 
DUSOLLIER Final 12/5/2011  8:59 PM 
816 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:4 
process.36  In Belgium, Green MPs have introduced bills that would allow P2P file 
sharing and collect remuneration from ISPs to compensate copyright owners.37  
Due to their limited representation in the Belgian Parliament and the declared 
opposition of other political forces to the solution, those bills appear to have no 
chance of success.  Nonetheless, the proposals have succeeded in launching a lively 
debate in Belgium. 
P2P legalization finds support in many organizations.  In Brazil, a movement 
called “Compartilhamento Legal!” has proposed a revision of the copyright law to 
legalize noncommercial file sharing in exchange for a levy on broadband Internet 
access.38  Sometimes, owners of copyright—more often, owners of neighboring 
rights—also promote the solution of a loss of control over P2P file sharing, 
compensated by some financial return to authors and artists.  This is true in the case 
of the Alliance Public-Artistes in France, which is comprised of performers’ and 
consumers’ associations, and of the Songwriters Association of Canada, which 
promotes the creation of a new “right of remuneration” for the sharing of music.39 
Whether originating from academics, elected representatives or artists, these 
proposals all share the idea, articulated by Litman, that “[f]rom the vantage point of 
music creators, replacing the theoretical control they enjoy under the copyright law 
with an enforceable promise of payment makes them no worse off, and makes most 
of them better off.”40  Proponents of these proposals contemplate legalizing 
noncommercial file sharing, agreeing that attempts to ban the technology or the 
 
 36. Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 
2001 O.J. (L 167) 10–19 (EC). 
 37. Proposition de loi visant à adapter la perception du droit d'auteur à l'évolution technologique 
tout en préservant le droit à la vie privée des usagers d'Internet [Bill to Adjust Copyright Law to 
Technological Developments While Preserving Internet Users’ Right to Privacy] (Sen. Benoit Hellings 
and Freya Piryns), Mar. 2, 2010, S.4-1686, available at 
http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/dossier&LEG=4&NR=1686&LANG=fr [hereinafter Hellings & 
Piryns Bill].  Another almost identical bill has been proposed under the current legislature to replace the 
former one.  See Proposition de loi visant à adapter la perception du droit d'auteur à l'évolution 
technologique tout en préservant le droit à la vie privée des usagers d'Internet [Bill to Adjust Copyright 
Law to Technological Developments While Preserving Internet Users’ Right to Privacy] (Sen. Jacky 
Morael and Frey Piryns), Dec. 9, 2010, S. 5-590, available at http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/ 
index_senate&MENUID=22101&Lang=fr (follow “5-501 à 5-600” hyperlink; then follow “5-590” 
hyperlink).  During a previous legislative term, another Senator proposed a bill providing for a 
HADOPI-like solution based on a three-strikes approach.  See Proposition de loi favorisant la protection 
de la création culturelle sur Internet [Bill Promoting the Protection of Cultural Creation on the Internet] 
(Sen. Philippe Monfils), Apr. 21, 2010, S. 4-1748, available at http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/ 
index_senate&MENUID=22101&Lang=fr (follow “4-1701 à 4-1800”; then follow “4-1748” hyperlink). 
 38. See COMPARTILHAMENTO LEGAL, http://www.compartilhamentolegal.org (last visited Mar. 8, 
2011).  For an explanation in English, see Volker Grassmuck, Compartilhamento legal!—Brazil is 
Putting an End to the ‘War on Copying,’ at R$ 3,00 per Month, VGRASS.DE (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.vgrass.de/?p=382. 
 39. L’ALLIANCE PUBLIC.ARTISTES, http://alliance.bugiweb.com/pages/1_1.html (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2001); The Songwriters Association of Canada’s Proposal to Monetize the Non-Commercial 
Sharing of Music, SONGWRITERS ASS’N CAN. (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.songwriters.ca/proposaldetailed.aspx [hereinafter SAC]. 
 40. Litman, supra note 25, at 37. 
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practice, or to discourage users from engaging in such sharing, have proven 
unsuccessful and unpopular.  These endeavors to control file sharing have not 
generated revenue to copyright owners, whereas a system of levy-based 
compensation to creators and artists could.41 
B.  POSSIBLE MODELS FOR AUTHORIZING USES OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP 
The many proposals for authorizing P2P noncommercial file sharing can be 
distinguished from each other by showing what legal structures each model 
borrows from current copyright law and practice that authorizes uses of works of 
authorship. 
One key principle of copyright law is that authorization should come from the 
copyright owner because she enjoys exclusive rights in her work.  The principle of 
exclusivity suggests that the copyright owner should decide whether or not to 
authorize use of her work and upon what conditions her work may be used.  
Exclusivity-based copyright in principle requires that authorization is given 
individually by authors and other rights holders. 
Veering away from that key paradigm, however, other methods of authorizing 
use of copyrighted work exist.  These methods can be classified by their various 
degrees of deviation from the default rule that direct and individual licenses are 
given by copyright owners.  Limitations to exclusive rights and individual 


















or fair use 
 
Moving along the continuum, the next step after full individual exercise of one’s 
exclusive rights under copyright is to entrust those rights to a collective 
management organization (“CMO”).  CMOs can then license authorization to use 
works on behalf of the copyright owners who they represent.  Such management is 
sometimes more effective than individual management for both copyright owners 
and users.  Copyright owners benefit because CMOs have better bargaining power 
and can better locate potential users, negotiate with them and enforce rights.  For 
users, CMOs act as one-stop shops for the authorizations they seek.  Copyright 
collectives are traditionally said to reduce transaction costs in enforcing 
 
 41. Even the HADOPI graduated approach in France does not compensate authors and producers 
because the judicial procedure is expedited and does not allow copyright owners to claim damages. 
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copyright.42 
Collective management may be considered a limitation on the exclusive rights 
of owners paradigm, as it departs from the principle of an individual choice and 
exploitation of copyright.  However, the limitation only extends to the method of 
exercising one’s copyright.  CMOs defend and exercise rights that can still be 
considered exclusive.  Although they exercise rights collectively and might face 
antitrust law issues in some circumstances if they refuse to license their repertoire, 
CMOs do not lose the ability to refuse licensing.  Therefore, copyright ownership is 
not really limited.  Instead, its exercise is limited only to the extent that the author 
loses her individual capacity to accept or refuse an exploitation of her work.  By 
entrusting a CMO with management of her copyright, the author accepts the 
collective decision and its effects.  As participation is based on contractual assent 
and adhesion to the organization, the copyright owner, if not satisfied with the 
management of her rights, can still terminate her membership and regain her 
individual exclusive rights. 
The described limitation can be more or less significant depending on the type 
of collective management.  In principle, collective management is voluntary:  
authors decide to adhere to an organization that they entrust with the exercise of 
their copyright.  However, two types of collective management schemes erode the 
contractual freedom of authors.  First, contractual freedom is weakened when 
collective management is mandatory and imposed by law.  A notable example of 
this scheme can be seen with cable retransmission rights in the European Union, 
where authors and other owners of rights have no choice but to commit the exercise 
of their rights to CMOs.43  If owners do not expressly enlist with any organization, 
the law presumes that the most representative CMO in the sector represents them.  
Therefore, the copyright owner has no alternative to collective management and it 
is unlikely that a CMO could refuse licensing in such a legally imposed scenario. 
A second scheme that erodes contractual freedom is extended collective 
management—most widely known in Nordic European countries—which has been 
described as “the situation where a license agreement freely negotiated between a 
collective management organization and a user . . . by legal provision is extended 
onto the works of rights holders who are not members of the CMO.”44  Also called 
“extended collected licensing” (“ECL”), this model effectively mandates collective 
representation and management for copyright owners who are not members of 
CMOs by extending clauses of a collective licensing agreement to an entire class of 
similar works or rights.45  To mitigate the mandatory imposition of the collective 
 
 42. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996). 
 43. See Council Directive 93/83, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15, 20 (EC) (concerning “the Coordination of 
Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite 
Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission”). 
 44. CHRISTIAN RYDNING, EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENCES—THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE 
NORDIC SOLUTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EC LAW 11 (2010). 
 45. On extended collective management, see Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, Collective Management in 
the Nordic Countries, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2006), 
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agreement on authors who have chosen to stay outside of the CMO, the extended 
collective licensing model may give authors the choice to “opt out” and 
individually manage their rights.  However, the ability to opt out is not an essential 
trait of ECLs, despite what commentators often suggest.46  In an extended 
collective management model, copyright owners who are not members of a CMO 
are legally and automatically integrated into the collective management system.  
The model therefore abrogates the principle of individual exercise.  The extent of 
such restriction depends on whether the extended collective management allows the 
author to then remove herself from the system and regain her individual exercise of 
copyright or not.47 
Both mandatory and extended forms of voluntary collective management have 
been devised by law to ease copyright clearance, to reduce transaction costs for 
users and to limit fragmentation of copyrights.48  The mandatory regime avoids 
individual management and the extended regime fills gaps in the repertoire licensed 
by a CMO.  In these regards, they both limit the exercise of copyright, even though 
the limitation imposed by extended collective management may be less than that 
imposed by mandatory collective management because the restriction under 
extended collective management is only suffered by authors who are not members 
of the CMO.  When an opt out mechanism is provided, this restriction is all the 
more limited.49 
On the other end of the continuum, compulsory licensing and copyright 
exceptions are genuine limitations to the principle of exclusive rights, as they 
legally deprive rights holders of any control over use of their works.  Copyright 
exceptions or fair use deem certain uses to be out of copyright.  These uses 
therefore cannot be prohibited by the copyright owner and do not give rise to any 
compensation.  When a compulsory licensing scheme is provided by the law, the 
use of copyrighted works cannot be prevented or controlled by copyright owners 
who are, however, compensated for such use.  This is the nature of the private copy 
regime in Canada and most of Europe.  A distinction is sometimes drawn between 
compulsory licensing and statutory licensing.  The former is characterized by the 
fact that rights owners maintain some power to negotiate the level of compensation, 
whereas the rate of the levy imposed in the latter is decided upon by a legislator or 
an administrative body. 
Among these possibilities for authorization of uses of copyrighted works, only 
 
supra note 2, at 257–82; Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic 
Experience:  It’s a Hybrid but Is it a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471 (2010). 
 46. Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 45, at 476. 
 47. Id. at 482. 
 48. Rydning, supra note 44, at 7. 
 49. Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital, 
Networked Environment:  Voluntary, Presumption-Based, Extended, Mandatory, Possible, Inevitable?, 
in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2006), supra note 2, at 48 
[hereinafter Ficsor, Collective Management in the Digital, Networked Environment].  But see Riis & 
Schovsbo, supra note 45, at 487 (arguing that unrepresented authors might not know that a license has 
been granted on their behalf, which lessens the efficiency of the opt out escape). 
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collective management, compulsory licensing and uncompensated exceptions 
would allow blanket licensing, whereby the user would obtain a single license or 
statutory authorization covering an unlimited repertoire of a category of works or of 
all categories of works. 
The variations of licensing schemes for copyrighted works, and the extent they 
restrict exclusive rights, can now be presented as follows: 
 
 Scheme for 
authorizing use 








 Exercise of exclusive copyright 
 
2. Voluntary collective 
management 
Rights entrusted with a 
CMO implying an 
abandon of individual 
management 
 Blanket Licensing (or global license) 
3. Extended collective 
management 
Same as voluntary 
collective management 
for members of the 
CMO; statutorily 
imposed loss of 
individual management 
for nonmembers of the 
CMO 
4. Mandatory collective 
management 
Statutorily imposed  
loss of  
individual management 
5. Compulsory or 
statutory licensing 
Loss of exclusive  




itation to  
 exclusive copyright 
6. Exception or fair use Loss of exclusive  





In proposals put forward to authorize P2P file sharing, a system of blanket 
licensing appears to be favorable to users because it would cover uses of a mass of 
content.  Individual management has neither been seen as an adequate solution for 
P2P networks, nor envisioned as a possibility to authorize file sharing because it 
has most often attempted to halt such mass transfer of works. 
Exception with no compensation has also not been proposed because its lack of 
any compensation for copyright owners would seem to be unthinkable. 
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It leaves us with the following legal models:  the compulsory licensing or the 
collective management, possibly aided by statutory imposition of a mandatory or 
extended collective management.  The latter variations of collective management 
makes the licensing of mass online uses more efficient.50 
C.  THE LEGAL MODELS AND DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED P2P AUTHORIZATION 
SCHEMES 
Now that the different legal schemes for authorizing use have been sketched out, 
the proposals for licensing mass uses of works in P2P networks can be further 
described and categorized into the three main blanket licensing mechanisms 
identified above.  Most of the proposals involve compulsory licensing schemes, 
where, instead of exclusive rights for copyright owners, users would be authorized 
by law to share music and other digital files.51  However, the proposals drafted by 
the Songwriters Association of Canada and by Gervais are based on voluntary 
collective management.52  Aigrain advocates an extended collective licensing 
system, but his system would turn to compulsory licensing if CMOs do not agree to 
license the right to engage in P2P file transfer.53  The model put forward by the 
French Alliance Public-Artistes is a hybrid one:  compulsory licensing (private 
copy regime) for the downloading of works, but mandatory collective management 
for the uploading of works.54 
Pending Belgian bills on the matter would create an extended collective 
licensing regime.  If enacted, this regime would be the first appearance of an 
extended collective management mechanism in Belgian copyright law.  This is 
surprising, considering that the licensing granted to ISPs by collective management 
would equally apply to nonmembers of the CMO.55 
Though the proposed models seem to share much in common, the differences lie 
in their details (where the devil might be, according to Litman and Netanel).56 
Some proposals give rights holders the choice to opt out of a default compulsory 
or voluntary licensing rule (set by either the law or by the CMO).  This is the case 
in the models proposed by Litman, Gervais and Aigrain.57  The Fisher model is 
 
 50. Gervais, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2010), supra 
note 2, at 21. 
 51. See Ku, supra note 31, at 311–15; Litman, supra note 25, at 41; Netanel, supra note 1, at 4; 
Peukert, supra note 32, at 190. 
 52. See SAC, supra note 39; see also Daniel J. Gervais, User-Generated Content and Music File-
Sharing:  A Look at Some of the More Interesting Aspects of Bill C-32, in FROM  “RADICAL 
EXTREMISM” TO “BALANCED COPYRIGHT”:  CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 463 
(Michael Geist ed., 2010) [hereinafter Gervais, User-Generated Content].  In an earlier article, Gervais 
added the extended collective licensing option to his collective management model.  See Gervais, 
Considerations on Excludability, supra note 31. 
 53. AIGRAIN, supra note 35, at 35–37. 
 54. See Qu'est-ce Que la Licence Globale?, L’ALLIANCE PUBLIC.ARTISTES, http:// 
alliance.bugiweb.com/pages/2_1.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 55. See Hellings & Piryns Bill, supra note 37, art. 2. 
 56. Litman, supra note 25, at 34; see also Netanel, supra note 1, at 7. 
 57. AIGRAIN, supra note 35, at 50 (arguing that it would work better if the copyright owners do 
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similar to the extent that copyright owners would be entitled to compensation only 
if they have registered their works.58  The opt in model sketched by Peukert more 
closely resembles a voluntary exercise of copyright, as the default rule would be the 
control of P2P file sharing by exclusive rights.59  Similarly, Aigrain limits blanket 
licensing to works that have been made digitally available with the consent of their 
copyright owners, meaning that users could not exchange bootlegged films or 
concerts.60 
Sometimes, it is the users who are given the choice of whether to opt in or out.  
When a levy is collected on all Internet access fees or consumer electronics 
devices, some consumers might object to paying for acts of distribution of 
copyrighted files they do not engage in.  This drawback of any levy system is often 
denounced in the European Union, where all purchasers of blank media or 
recording devices bear the burden of the levy even if they do not personally engage 
in private copying with such equipment or media.61  To counter such criticism, 
many P2P proposals offer Internet access subscribers the choice of either paying or 
not paying the monthly fee that would allow them to engage in P2P file sharing.  
This is the case with the Songwriters Association of Canada model and with the 
French Alliance Public-Artistes, and such a possibility is also discussed by 
Litman.62  However, Aigrain argues that because all Internet users will benefit from 
the thriving digital culture fostered by a levy system, all users should also be 
required to bear its costs.63  In a tax-based or levy-based compulsory licensing 
system, however, there is no choice for Internet users, as the compensation is a 
form of levy on all products and services, irrespective of their effective use.64 
Methods of implementing the levy may also vary.  The rate may be fixed by the 
government or by an administrative body.  Alternatively, it may be negotiated by 
the rights holders with users or ISPs and subject to administrative determination in 
the absence of an agreement.65  It may be levied only on broadband Internet access 
 
not opt out and predicting that the success of the system would gradually deter them from opting out); 
Gervais, User-Generated Content, supra note 52, at 463; Litman, supra note 25, at 45–46. 
 58. Fisher, supra note 20, at 199–258 (predicting that his proposed system would ultimately 
replace the current copyright law and that registration would become the default choice. 
 59. Peukert, supra note 32, at 190–92. 
 60. AIGRAIN, supra note 35, at 51–52. 
 61. Case C-467/08, Padawan v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) (Oct. 
21, 2010), http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=C-467/ 
08 (follow “Case c-467/08 Judgement 2010-10-21” hyperlink).  The court stated: 
where the equipment at issue has been made available to natural persons for private purposes it is 
unnecessary to show that they have in fact made private copies with the help of that equipment 
and have therefore actually caused harm to the author of the protected work . . . . [T]he fact that 
that equipment or devices are able to make copies is sufficient in itself to justify the application 
of the private copying levy . . . . 
Id. ¶¶ 54–56. 
 62. See Litman, supra note 25, at 44–45; Qu'est-ce Que la Licence Globale?, supra note 54; 
SAC, supra note 39. 
 63. AIGRAIN, supra note 35, at 54. 
 64. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 20; Lunney, supra note 31; Peukert, supra note 32, at 192. 
 65. See FISHER, supra note 20; Gervais, User-Generated Content, supra note 52, at 463 
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or it may be levied on a vast array of products and services—from consumer 
electronics devices (i.e. those used to make or store copies or to download files 
from the Internet) to blank media.66  When the models proposed are so structured as 
to calculate the rate of the levy or fee that would be reasonable both for consumers 
and for its beneficiaries, its amount is generally in the range of five to ten dollars or 
euros.67 
Whatever the details, the general idea behind these blanket licensing proposals 
remains the same.  A fee would be collected either from the cost of Internet access 
or from the cost of devices used to share and copy works.  CMOs would be in 
charge of collecting and distributing these fees to copyright owners.  Users would 
benefit from such a system that would permit them to share copyrighted works on 
P2P networks.  From this general mold, one can identify three distinct legal 
models. 
The first model would be based on compulsory licensing, like the private copy 
model that exists in most of the European Union.  In such a scheme, the levy would 
be paid by ISPs (in the case of the levy imposed on Internet broadband access) or 
by providers of the devices or media upon which the levy is imposed.  However, 
these costs would probably be passed through to all their customers, whether they 
use P2P or not.  Thus, this is a system of rough justice where the contribution to 
creators is blindly aggregated. 
The second model would be a voluntary collective management licensing 
system in which a contract is formed between the CMO and the ISP.  Granting the 
license to the ISP is somewhat strange from a legal perspective because the ISP 
itself does not infringe copyright by making works of authorship publicly available.  
However, one can argue that, economically speaking, the ISPs gain an advantage 
when their broadband services are mainly used for mass downloading (legal or 
not).  But legally, the ISP is not entering into the contract to get a license from 
exploitation of copyrighted works, but rather concludes such a contract for the sole 
benefit of its subscribers, which is known in civil law as a “stipulation for another 
person.”  This might have differences in the overall organization of the licensing 
model, as well as strategic disadvantages as we will see below. 
Finally, in the third model (also within a collective management licensing 
regime), the contract could be formed directly between the CMO and the users, 
rendering the ISP a mere intermediary that delivers the licensing contract to its 
 
(providing that if no agreement can be reached, the rate would be fixed by the Canadian Copyright 
Board); Netanel, supra note 1, at 44–45 (suggesting that if no agreement can be reached, then the rate 
would be fixed by a Copyright Office Tribunal); L’ALLIANCE PUBLIC.ARTISTES, supra note 39; SAC, 
supra note 39. 
 66. See AIGRAIN, supra note 35; FISHER, supra note 20, at 280; Litman, supra note 25, at 41; 
Netanel, supra note 1, at 43–44; L’ALLIANCE PUBLIC.ARTISTES, supra note 39.  See generally Lunney, 
supra note 31, at 911–20. 
 67. This would amount to between five and ten Canadian dollars in the SAC model and between 
four and seven euros in the Alliance Public-Artistes model.  Around ten percent of the retail price of the 
products or services are taxed in Fisher’s approach and this amount is reduced to four percent by 
Netanel.  See FISHER, supra note 20; Netanel, supra note 1, at 4. 
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subscribers. 
Unlike compulsory licensing, in the latter two collective management models, 
the user is not obliged to obtain and pay for the license.  User choice is clearly 
present in the third model, but it is also present in the second model where the ISP 
offers its customers such a choice.  If users are presented with such a choice, a 
stronger case can be made for prosecuting those who refuse the license yet continue 
illegally sharing files under HADOPI-style enforcement or other means.  One can 
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III.  LEGAL OBSTACLES 
Critics of P2P file sharing proposals argue that most of the proposed 
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mechanisms would not meet the Berne Convention’s requirements.68  Because a 
P2P licensing system would cover both domestic and foreign works, any such 
system would need to be Berne-compliant.  Discussion has focused on provisions 
of the Berne Convention that allow for compulsory licensing in limited 
circumstances, on the three-step test with which all limitations and exceptions must 
comply, and for some compulsory licensing mechanisms only, on the rule 
prohibiting formalities to enjoy and exercise copyright protection. 
A.  THE ADMISSION OF COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER THE BERNE 
CONVENTION 
The Berne Convention allows compulsory licensing schemes in limited cases.  
For example, article 11bis (concerning broadcasting and related rights) and article 
13 (concerning the right of recording of musical works—but not audiovisual 
works) clearly allow for compulsory licensing.69  Other provisions of the 
Convention allow the countries to set conditions for limiting copyright in the case 
of speeches (Art. 2bis(2)), quotations and illustrations for teaching (Art. 10) and 
reproductions of articles or broadcasts for news reporting (Art. 10bis).  As mere 
exceptions, however, these provisions do not impose compulsory licensing.70 
Articles 11bis and 13 are traditionally construed as permitting compulsory 
licensing.  Article 13 allows for the most flexibility, but only pertains to musical 
works and not to audiovisual works.71  As a result, a compulsory licensing system 
that covers all types of works would not be admissible per se under the Berne 
Convention.  However, it could still be admitted if compliant with the three-step 
test. 
Meanwhile, there has been an extensive discussion among copyright scholars 
regarding the possibility of attaching extended or mandatory collective 
 
 68. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 25 
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne]. 
 69. Article 11bis provides: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under 
which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions 
shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any 
circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable 
remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority. 
Id. art. 11bis. 
Article 13 states: 
Each country of the Union may impose for itself reservations and conditions on the exclusive 
right granted to the author of a musical work and to the author of any words, the recording of 
which together with the musical work has already been authorized by the latter, to authorize the 
sound recording of that musical work, together with such words, if any; but all such reservations 
and conditions shall apply only in the countries which have imposed them and shall not, in any 
circumstances, be prejudicial to the rights of these authors to obtain equitable remuneration 
which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority. 
Id. art. 13. 
 70. Berne, supra note 68, arts. 11bis, 13. 
 71. Id. art. 13. 
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management to the preexisting compulsory licensing provisions in the Berne 
Convention.  Attachment of such mechanisms could allow for P2P transfers 
without necessitating passing the three-step test.  Generally, one must ask whether 
mandatory or extended collective management qualify as either exceptions to or 
limitations on relevant exclusivity rights.  If they do, then they must either fall 
within the compulsory licensing provisions of Berne or pass the three-part test to be 
implementable.  If they do not count as exceptions or limitations, then either system 
could be freely imposed by the lawmaker with no Berne-compliance inquiry.  Silke 
von Lewinski takes the latter view with regards to mandatory collective 
management, which she argues is not a “limitation” because it merely organizes the 
ways of exercising copyright without limiting it in any way: 
The mandatory collective administration however does not affect the 
exclusive right itself; the covered uses are not authorized by law.  Rather, the 
author is only restricted in the options of exercising the right:  he is left with 
the only possibility to exercise the exclusive right through the collecting 
society, whereas the right itself is not limited as such, in particular not in 
favor of any such interest of the public at large.72 
Thus, according to von Lewinski, mandatory collective management is simply a 
collective management of exclusive rights that can only benefit the authors:  their 
rights stay unlimited, they can fix tariffs and conditions through their CMO and, 
more generally, CMOs have a record of efficiency in managing the rights of their 
members. 
Ficsor takes the opposite view.73  For him, even organizing the exercise of 
copyright in a certain way constitutes a “limitation” based on the notion that 
granting an exclusive right to authors should entail full-fledged exclusivity.74  
Accordingly, he argues that a mandatory collective management system can only 
be admitted when the Berne Convention allows compulsory licensing, which is 
further demonstrated by articles 11bis and 13, which apply to “the conditions of 
exercise” of the exclusive rights.  This view is shared by other commentators and 
sometimes is applied to extended collective management as well.75 
 
 72. Silke von Lewinski, Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive Rights—A Case Study 
on Its Compatibility with International and EC Copyright Law, E-COPYRIGHT BULL., Jan.–Mar. 2004, at 
5, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/19552/11515904771svl_e.pdf/svl_e.pdf; see also Christophe 
Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the Information Society, 
E-COPYRIGHT BULL.,  Jan.–Mar. 2007, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/34481/ 
11883823381test_trois_etapes_en.pdf/test_trois_etapes_en.pdf. 
 73. See Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights at a Triple 
Crossroads:  Should it Remain Voluntary or May it Be “Extended” or Made Mandatory?, COPYRIGHT 
BULL., Oct. 2003, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/14935/10657988721Ficsor_Eng.pdf/ 
Ficsor%2BEng.pdf. 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. DANIEL GERVAIS, APPLICATION OF AN EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING REGIME IN 
CANADA:  PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION 40 (2003) (providing study for the 
Dep’t of Canadian Heritage) [hereinafter Gervais, APPLICATION OF AN EXTENDED REGIME IN CANADA]; 
Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 45, at 485; see also, CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET 
ARTISTIQUE, LA DISTRIBUTION DES CONTENUS NUMÉRIQUES EN LIGNE 67 (2005). 
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In any case, mechanisms authorizing P2P file sharing, though not explicitly 
provided for by the Berne Convention under a compulsory licensing or other 
scheme, could still be enacted if they pass the three-step test discussed below. 
B.  THE THREE-STEP TEST 
1.  Scope of Application of the Three-Step Test 
A levy-based compulsory licensing system will have to satisfy the three-step test 
set forth by article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS 
agreement.76  The TRIPS agreement provides:  “[m]embers shall confine 
limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the rights holder.”77  As the above section began to 
discuss, there is disagreement as to the compatibility of various blanket licensing 
schemes with the three-step test; while a compulsory licensing scheme is 
unquestionably subject to the test, it is less clear whether a mandatory or extended 
collective management system would be.78 
The wording of the three-step test in the TRIPS agreement and the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty of 1996 confines the test to “limitations . . . or exceptions.”79  As 
for the Berne Convention, article 9(2) simply says that “it shall be a matter for 
legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction in certain 
special cases . . . .”80  This language seems to suggest that the test applies to neither 
mandatory nor extended collective management systems because under collective 
management systems permission is given by authors through CMOs—not through 
“legislation.” 
Hugenholtz and Okediji argue that mandatory collective management is 
“technically not a limitation, since the exclusive economic right remains intact and 
can still be enforced on behalf of right holders by designated collecting societies.”81  
In other words, copyright owners do not lose their enforcement power solely on the 
ground that they are legally obliged to collectively manage their right for that use 
(mandatory collective management) or that they are presumed to be represented by 
the CMO that has licensed it (extended collective management).  The exceptions or 
limitations to which the three-step test applies should be restricted to cases where 
 
 76. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Berne, supra note 68, art. 9(2). 
 77. TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 13. 
 78. RYDNING, supra note 44, at 25 (arguing that extended collective management and mandatory 
collective management require application of the three-step test because they imply an element of 
coercion); Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 45, at 486 (stressing application of the three-step test at least for 
extended collective licensing with no opt out mechanism). 
 79. WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65; TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 13. 
 80. Berne, supra note 68, art. 9(2) (emphasis added). 
 81. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON 
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 19 (2008); see also GERVAIS, APPLICATION OF AN 
EXTENDED REGIME IN CANADA, supra note 75, at 11; von Lewinski, supra note 72, at 5. 
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the copyright owner is genuinely deprived of any possibility to enforce her rights 
and not where only some means of exercising them are restricted, as is the case 
here. 
The purpose of the three-step test is to safeguard a copyright owner’s exclusive 
right to exploit her work.  To this end, exceptions to copyright are admissible only 
if they do not hamper those forms of exploitation of the work that produce 
substantial revenues for the copyright owners or that are likely to “acquire 
considerable economic or practical importance” in the future.82  As a policy matter, 
it does not make sense to classify mechanisms aimed at achieving effective 
exploitation of works into the category of “limitations and exceptions.”  European 
lawmakers appear to recognize this.  Recital 18 of the Information Society 
Directive of 2001 states, “this Directive is without prejudice to the arrangements in 
the Member States concerning the management of rights such as extended 
collective licenses,” which suggests that models related to the management of 
rights would escape the regulation imposed on “limitations” on copyright.83 
Treating collective management as a limitation does not make much sense when 
an opt out mechanism is provided for copyright owners who wish to avoid the 
extended collective management effect.  In such a case, copyright owners are able 
to restore the full-fledge exercise of their exclusive rights, including the individual 
exercise.  Therefore, their rights are only limited, to the extent they might not be 
aware of the collective management extended to them, as nonmembers of the 
CMO.  In the case of extended collective management, the limitation of copyright 
is only imposed on authors who are not members of the CMO; the represented 
authors can be said to be regularly exercising their rights.84 
In conclusion, solutions for P2P based on mandatory or extended collective 
management theoretically need not be subject to the three-step test.  Nevertheless, 
employing the three-part test might be beneficial, given that these solutions are not 
otherwise formally recognized by the Berne Convention:  compliance with the 
three-part test could only lend them greater legitimacy. 
2.  Assessment of the Proposed Schemes Under the Three-Step Test 
The scholars who have proposed to authorize P2P file sharing have generally 
applied the three-step test to their proposed models.85  The first step of the test does 
not raise difficulties.  The language “certain special cases” has been construed as 
 
 82. Panel Report, United States—Article 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, ¶ 6.180, WT/DS160/R 
(June 15, 2000).  For similar criteria, see MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE 
THREE-STEP TEST:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT 
LAW 177 (2004) (defining normal exploitation as “all forms of exploiting a work, which have, or are 
likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance”). 
 83. Directive 2001/29, supra note 36, at 11.  This interpretation, however, is not shared by 
Rydning.  See RYDNING, supra note 44, at 94. 
 84. RYDNING, supra note 44, at 49. 
 85. See Litman, supra note 25, at 45–47; Netanel, supra note 1, at 60 n.199; Peukert, supra note 
32, at 160–175. 
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requiring that the limitation be properly defined and narrow in scope.  It can be 
argued that any form of a global authorization for P2P file sharing is a “certain 
special case” if its conditions (e.g. its limitations on noncommercial sharing) are 
specified and can easily be distinguished from impermissible uses.86 
The second step, which deals with conflicts with normal exploitation, is 
typically the most complicated prong of the test.  Under the “normal exploitation” 
test, a limitation is impermissible if it covers uses of works that should normally be 
subject to exploitation by the copyright owners.  Such a limitation would obstruct 
the economic core of exclusive rights, depriving rights holders of substantial 
revenues from an actual or potential market that they have the right to 
commercially exploit. 
It is unlikely that copyright owners would issue individual licenses to users for 
P2P file sharing in the absence of a compulsory licensing system.  More likely than 
not, mass uses of works over P2P would simply be outright prohibited by copyright 
owners.  It is thus difficult to measure the normal exploitation of works of uses of 
works that largely stay out of control by the copyright owners.  As aptly stated by 
Rydning, in the situation involving illegal uses, “it is not the limitation, but rather 
the failure to ensure user compliance with the initial state of prohibition that causes 
the conflict with the normal exploitation of the work.”87 
Licensing that originates in collective management helps copyright owners to 
control uses of their works that would otherwise remain out of their reach and 
uncompensated.  This is particularly true with extended collective management, 
which kicks in only after negotiations and licensing have occurred between a CMO 
and users.  Lawmakers extend the agreements reached by the CMO to 
unrepresented copyright owners, thus acknowledging that these licensing 
agreements represent the normal exploitation scheme for that use.88  In interpreting 
the three-step test, the World Trade Organization Panel has held that: 
an exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic legislation rises to 
the level of a conflict with a normal exploitation of the work . . . if uses, that 
in principle are covered by that right but exempted under the exception or 
limitation, enter into economic competition with the ways that right holders 
normally extract economic value from that right to the work (i.e., the 
copyright) and thereby deprive them of significant or tangible commercial 
gains.89 
This suggests that another way of interpreting the test could be to measure the 
effect of the exempted uses on markets controlled and exploited by copyright 
owners. 90  In other words, if the exempted use under the exception crowds out the 
normal markets controlled by copyright owners, the exception would be prohibited 
under the three-step test.  Here, the conflict with normal exploitation is between the 
 
 86. Peukert, supra note 32, at 164. 
 87. RYDNING, supra note 44, at 60. 
 88. Id. at 63. 
 89. Panel Report, supra note 82, ¶ 6.183. 
 90. Id. 
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exempted use and other markets controlled by rights holders—not between the 
exempted use and the same use if controlled by the rights holders.91 
Applying this second interpretation does not yield a definitive answer.  Online 
sales of music or films would undoubtedly be considered a “normal exploitation” 
of their works. Economic studies are divided between those showing that illegal 
downloads do not harm legal sales and those showing such downloads to be the 
main cause of the music industry’s decline.92  Would legalizing file sharing under 
blanket licensing compete with legal platforms?  It might in a compulsory licensing 
scheme, as it would allow any user to get access to music, films or other digital 
content through P2P networks for a minimal sum.  Supposing that mandatory or 
extended collective management are considered to be “limitations” requiring 
compliance with the three-step test, their assessment under the scrutiny of the test 
would not be very different.  Although in theory, the copyright owners in such 
collective management schemes could set any fee for the license, practically 
speaking, that sum would not exceed a limited amount per month, so as not to make 
illegal file sharing attractive.  The lower that monthly fee, the more likely it would 
compete with other Web platforms selling entertainment.  However, the thrust of 
mandatory and extended collective management is that copyright owners would 
voluntarily choose the license on the basis of their exclusive rights.  It therefore 
seems paradoxical to conclude that this exploitation, consented to by the copyright 
owners, would contradict the other markets equally controlled by them. 
The final prong of the three-step test assesses whether there is unreasonable 
prejudice to the legitimate interests of the copyright holders.  This is a balancing 
test of sorts:  the limitation will only be accepted if, in its form and effect, it does 
not cause an excessive harm to the authors.  Here, the nature of the limitation and 
its effect on exclusive rights will be key factors.  Uncompensated limitations, for 
instance, would be frowned upon by this prong, but may nevertheless be 
permissible if the exempted use is in the public’s interest (e.g. in the case of parody 
or quotation).  In cases of noncommercial file sharing, however, compensation is 
certainly required to accommodate the interests of copyright holders.  When an 
option to opt out of compulsory licensing is offered to authors (as Litman 
proposes), this third step might be less of a challenge because authors are given the 
option of regaining their exclusive rights.93 
Collective management would benefit copyright owners more than a 
compulsory licensing system would.  In such a system (whether mandatory or 
extended), authors may keep their rights, continue to intervene in the imposition of 
tariffs and conditions on licensed exploitation and generally benefit from a 
collective process of negotiation in which they are represented by CMOs that aim 
to protect their interests.  Extended collective management with an opt out 
mechanism certainly does not raise a third-prong issue.  When legislators extend 
 
 91. For a useful analogy, see RYDNING, supra note 44, at 61. 
 92. See IFPI, IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011:  MUSIC AT THE TOUCH OF A BUTTON 14 (Jan. 
2011). 
 93. Peukert, supra note 32, at 174. 
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existing licensing agreements to nonmembers of the CMO, those licensing terms 
are ones that have been reached by a substantial number of authors of works of the 
same category, thereby “lessening the prejudice inflicted on the interests of the 
authors by the limitation.”94  Thus, those licenses will most likely sufficiently 
protect the interests of the nonmember copyright owners. 
In sum, a compulsory license geared at noncommercial uses in P2P networks 
probably would not pass the three-step test, as it would deprive the copyright 
owners of their ability to control file sharing and to directly compete with legal 
online platforms.  On the contrary, any solution based on collective management—
particularly imposing the extension of the repertoire licensed by the CMO through 
the addition of mandatory collective management or extended collective 
licensing—has a better chance to succeed.  First, it may fall outside the “exceptions 
and limitations” language entirely and therefore may not even trigger the test.  
Second, even if subject to the test, collective management will likely pass muster 
because, despite the fact that it deprives copyright owners of the individual exercise 
of their rights, it is a form of normal exploitation aimed at protecting the interests 
of the members of the CMO. 
C.  THE PROHIBITION OF FORMALITIES 
A final hurdle created by the international copyright treaties is the prohibition of 
any formality conditioning its existence or exercise, as laid down in article 5(2) of 
the Berne Convention.95  According to some, this prohibition would bar all 
solutions in which the copyright owner would regain its unabridged exercise of 
copyright when opting out of the licensing put in place by law or by a CMO.96  
Thus, it would bar both the levy-based compulsory license proposed by Litman 
with an opt out mechanism and the extended collective management where 
copyright owners are able to opt out from the collective management imposed on 
them. 
For Peukert, the opt out compulsory licensing regime proposed by Litman 
constitutes such a prohibited formality because the opt out would take the form of a 
publication of the work under a *.drm format that could be compared to the former 
U.S. notice and registration: 
While one might question whether this requirement is a ‘formality,’ it 
certainly can be said to impose a ‘condition’ in a more general sense that has 
to be complied with in order to ensure that the work does not fall under the 
limitation/exception for non-commercial file-sharing.97 
The “formalities” wording that replaced “formality and conditions” in the Berne 
 
 94. RYDNING, supra note 44, at 73. 
 95. Berne, supra note 68, art. 5(2). 
 96. See Ficsor, Collective Management in the Digital, Networked Environment, supra note 49, at 
48. 
 97. Peukert, supra note 32, at 184. 
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convention in 1908 is generally construed to encompass “conditions” as well.98  It 
does not mean, however, that all methods of exercising exclusive rights would be 
subject to the no-formalities rule.99 
It is because of this prohibition of formalities that Peukert has developed an opt 
in, rather than an opt out, solution.  In such a proposal, the default situation would 
be that of full exercise of exclusive rights; the formality (i.e. the opting into the 
levy-based compulsory licensing) would thus not condition the enjoyment of 
copyright but rather would limit it by the sole will of the copyright owner. 
Treating an opt out regime (whether opt out compulsory licensing or opt out 
extended collective licensing) as a prohibited “formality” seems somewhat radical.  
First, as far as opting out of a compulsory license is concerned, the “formality” 
would enable copyright owners to recover their full exclusive rights.  Limiting 
copyright is not unlawful under the Berne convention so long as it is compliant 
with the three-step test.  Thus, it seems illogical to interpret the “formalities” rule—
whose very objective is to protect the author—as barring an opt out system that 
would allow authors to regain the exclusivity of their rights.  The same argument 
can be used to dispute any classification of opt out extended collective licensing as 
a banned formality.100  Extended collective licensing does not prevent the exercise 
of an author’s copyright, but rather enables it.  Therefore, opting out is not so much 
a restoration of an author’s right to exercise her ownership, but rather is a choice to 
exercise that right in a different way.  For these reasons, article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention prohibiting formalities should not bar a P2P solution that would allow 
the copyright owners to opt out of compulsory licensing or extended collective 
licensing to regain full exclusivity and individual management of their rights. 
IV.  PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES 
Even if the legal obstacles are overcome, blanket licensing for P2P would still 
face many practical difficulties.  Economic difficulties—for example, determining 
the adequate level of compensation and finding ways to attract users without 
competing with other online platforms—will certainly arise.  However, those 
questions are beyond the scope of this Paper.  Instead, only practical hurdles with 
legal implications will be addressed here. 
A.  INVOLVEMENT OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS 
In most proposed models, the levy or tax will be included, whether exclusively 
or not, within the price of broadband Internet access.  This inclusion requires the 
participation of ISPs, who will either directly pay the levy or tax imposed upon 
 
 98. STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 161 (forthcoming 2011). 
 99. Gervais, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2006), supra 
note 2, at 33 (“[I]t would be patently incongruous to read Article 5(2) as preventing the mandatory doing 
of anything . . . .”). 
 100. Gervais, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2006), supra 
note 2, at 35. 
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their service or pass the costs on to customers.  Either case will lead to an 
increasing cost of Internet access, which is neither popular, nor economically 
viable.  Moreover, collecting fees and managing subscribers’ willingness to enter 
into licensing (in voluntary systems) will impose administrative costs on ISPs.  
Therefore, ISPs might be very reluctant to pay or transfer fees to copyright owners.  
Furthermore, models based on collective management generally use ISPs as the 
licensees of the CMOs, which would require their consent to contracts with 
copyright owners. 
ISPs have strong legal grounds for refusing any involvement in such a system 
(whether contractual or financial).  In both Europe and the United States, favorable 
safe harbor provisions shield ISPs (as “mere conduits”) from liability when 
infringement occurs on their networks.  Questions are currently pending in the 
European Union Court of Justice regarding whether an injunction to filter access to 
P2P networks imposed on an ISP is permissible under the safe harbor provisions of 
the E.U. directive on electronic commerce.101  Should the European judges rule that 
this filter requirement imposes an excessive burden on the ISPs, it would be even 
more difficult to involve ISPs in the fight against P2P file sharing.  Furthermore, 
bringing ISPs to the table to negotiate their involvement in any sort of licensing 
model may prove cumbersome if not mandated by lawmakers through a levy-based 
compulsory licensing system.  Any solution based on voluntary involvement of 
users, ISPs and CMOs must address this difficulty. 
A model in which P2P users contract with and pay fees to the CMOs might 
prove more successful.  In such a scenario, ISPs are mere intermediaries of the 
license and may be more willing to be involved.  Under one proposal, they may 
collect a service fee out of the sums paid by their customers to cover their own 
management costs.102 
B.  FRAGMENTED REPERTOIRE 
When acquiring a license, users will likely expect the fee they pay to provide 
unlimited sharing on P2P networks.  Although unlimited sharing would be the case 
with compulsory licenses, which are comprehensive in scope, it is less clear 
whether a collective management system would be capable of offering such a 
global license.  It is well known that copyright is fragmented in many regards:  a 
single CMO does not hold all the rights to a copyrighted work (e.g. the 
reproduction and performance rights), does not represent all the rights holders to a 
work (e.g. authors, producers, performers) and does not cover all types of works 
that might be transmitted through P2P networks.103  Regarding the various types of 
works, strategies might differ for music, audiovisual works, software or other 
 
 101. Case C-360/10, Belgische Verenigning van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (Sabam) v. 
Netlog NV, 2010 OJ (C 288) 18. 
 102. See AIGRAIN, supra note 35. 
 103. Gervais, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2006), supra 
note 2, at 10–12. 
DUSOLLIER Final 12/5/2011  8:59 PM 
834 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:4 
categories.  Because exploitation and markets for these various categories are 
different, collective licensing for P2P file sharing might not be equally relevant for 
all of them.  For example, Gervais has convincingly argued against including films 
in a model of global authorization.104 
In any case, any solution providing for blanket licensing must overcome the 
fragmentation of copyright management by achieving consensus between all 
interested parties, authors, film producers, music producers and performers.  
Consensus will not be easy as each stakeholder might have a different view and 
priority.  For example, producers, who prioritize protecting their markets, may seek 
to halt unauthorized P2P transfers entirely, while  performers may prefer 
compensation from exploitations bound to happen anyway. 
Once a consensus is found, one CMO should be designated as a one-stop-shop 
for users or ISPs.  This CMO should redistribute the collected sums to other CMOs 
representing different rights holders.  This collection model is in place in some 
European countries for photocopying or private copying.  On the territorial level, 
reciprocal agreements of collective management ensure that CMOs are able to 
grant licensing for foreign works administered by sister organizations.  However, 
the network of reciprocal agreements between many CMOs might not cover all 
domestic and foreign works.  This is another issue of fragmentation that will not be 
easy to tackle. 
C.  MEDIA CHRONOLOGY FOR AUDIOVISUAL WORKS 
A final problem specific to the film industry is media chronology.105  
Audiovisual works are traditionally exploited in successive release windows, 
starting with screening in theaters, followed by DVD rentals and sales and 
broadcasting, where pay-TV has a priority in time over free-to-air television.  
Allowing all content to be shared in P2P networks might run counter to this 
chronology:  if the licensing includes even recent films, for example, that could 
harm the copyright owner’s ability to exploit the film in a way that would allow 
him to recoup his investment. 
Though some countries still regulate chronology of media release windows, “the 
European legal framework for media windows has developed in a relatively clear 
way, characterized by the fact that strict legislative provisions have been abandoned 
in favor of contractual solutions.”106  A contractual solution could work, but it 
might also result in film producers removing recent productions from the blanket 
license for media chronology reasons.  This type of content segregation would 
require the establishment of some form of filtering for file transfers.  Filtering 
would require both technical identification of the works to be excluded and 
voluntary involvement of ISP in filtering the sharing of these works in their 
 
 104. Gervais, User-Generated Content, supra, note 52, at 458–59. 
 105. Martin Kuhr, Media Windows in Flux:  Challenges for Audiovisual Media Chronology, IRIS 
PLUS (2008), http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/iris/iris_plus/iplus4_2008.pdf.en. 
 106. Id. at 2. 
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networks. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In spite of the best efforts of music and film industries and lawmakers to enforce 
copyright, P2P file sharing has become a common means of gaining access to 
cultural and entertainment content for many Internet users.  Meanwhile, creators 
and performers are not getting any remuneration or damages from the millions of 
uses of their works made each day.  This reality arguably gives some weight to any 
proposal authorizing noncommercial P2P transfers under a global license that 
provides compensation to rights holders.  In most proposed schemes to that effect, 
CMOs would be in charge of collecting the levy and distributing it amongst 
copyright owners. 
The proposed models differ on many points and certainly raise some legal 
difficulties. Levy-based compulsory licensing would probably not conform to 
international copyright treaties, like the Berne Convention.  Other schemes based 
on collective management hence appear as more relevant.  Indeed, mandatory 
collective management and extended collective licensing can help collective 
management schemes to prevent copyright fragmentation and facilitate copyright 
clearance.  Despite the fact that these two mechanisms restrict the exclusivity and 
individuality of copyright, they could support a system granting mass 
authorizations to P2P users. 
In granting blanket licenses, CMOs would face practical difficulties.  The 
biggest one might be that all proposed schemes give a prominent role to Internet 
service providers, either as debtors of the levy, as collectors of the fees or as 
licensees.  Yet, the copyright regime has determined in recent years that Internet 
service providers should be exempted from liability in many cases and should not 
be forced to take on an active role. 
Do these difficulties mean that blanket licensing for P2P file sharing is an empty 
promise?  Not really.  Instead, they highlight the issues that must be addressed in 
future attempts to offer an alternative to repression-based solutions, like the three-
strikes approach, if such solutions prove to be unsuccessful or insufficient. 
 
